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INTRODUCTION

Extradition treaty implementations involving the United States
can best be described as a confused maze, thanks to the doctrine of
posse comitatus and its surrounding folklore. When nations enter
'into treaties of extradition with the United States they forget or
overlook several important features about the Republic. First, although the State Department professes to abide by the rule of law,
the facts suggest otherwise. The formalities of extradition have on
numerous occasions been ignored for the more expeditious and efficient method of kidnapping. 1 Second, other nations tend to ignore
that which the State Department does not - the fifty states and
their attendant posses. States, in fact, have minds of their own and,
short of firm national action, they determine for themselves what will
be more honored in the breach. Third, United States courts tend to
wink at treaty violations when accomplished for a "good" purpose,
such as return of drug dealers.
Such is the state of affairs in an apparent recent extradition
treaty dispute between the United States and Canada. Canada accused the State of Florida of failing to honor Canada's demand for
the return of one of its citizens kidnapped by bounty hunters. The
United States assaulted the state with pen and ink but little else. For
example, on July 26, 1983, then Attorney General William French
Smith and Secretary of State George M. Shultz, acting on behalf of
the United States, sent a letter to the Florida Probation and Parole
Commission.2 This letter urged the Commission to grant early parole
1. See, e.g., Evans, Acquisition of Custody over the InternationalFugitive Offender Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77
(1964). See also Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
2. Letter from Att'y Gen. William F. Smith and Sec'y of State George M. Shultz to the
Fla. Probation & Parole Comm'n (July 26, 1983) [hereinafter Smith/Shultz Letter].
I urge you to grant parole to Sidney Jaffe on the ground that his continued incarceration will exacerbate the already severe strain placed on the relations of the United States
with Canada arising out of circumstances under which Mr. Jaffe was returned from Canada to Florida to face the charges which resulted in his imprisonment.
The circumstances of Mr. Jaffe's return from Canada to Florida were examined in the
opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in the cases of Daniel Kear and
Timm Johnsen, respectively. In brief, the courts found that Kear and Johnsen were extraditable to Canada, a showing having been made of probable cause to believe that the
two "bounty hunters," who were acting as agents of the company that had posted bond
for Mr. Jaffe, had kidnapped Jaffe in Toronto, Canada and had brought him back to
Florida.
The United States has an extradition treaty with Canada. That treaty could have
been utilized to secure Mr. Jaffe's return; no one has suggested the contrary. How, then,
did it happen that Mr. Jaffe was returned by Kear and Johnsen? Canada, in a petition
for writ of Habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
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to a Canadian citizen whom bounty hunters illegally transported to
the United States.' Smith and Shultz reiterated the federal government's position that the alleged Florida-sanctioned activities violated
not only the existing Extradition Treaty between Canada and the
United States" but also principles of international law,5 including Catrict of Florida, alleges that Kear and Johnsen were "acting pursuant to a plan promoted
by officials of the State of Florida and under the color of authority of the State of Florida." The officials of the State of Florida whose conduct has been called into question by
Canada deny the charges, I understand, and I do not now take any position on the question whether there was state action or involvement in the alleged kidnapping of Mr.
Jaffe.
However, failure to utilize our extradition treaty with Canada to secure Mr. Jaffe's
return does appear to be attributable to the Office of State Attorney Stephen L. Boyles,
according to the report to Governor Graham prepared by the Governor's General Counsel. On May 18, 1981, when Mr. Jaffe failed to appear, Judge Perry ordered the State
Attorney to initiate extradition proceedings. Any request for Mr. Jaffe's extradition
would have been made by the Governor on the basis of supporting materials prepared by
the State Attorney's office. Documents submitted by the State Attorney's office were
found by the Governor's office to be legally insufficient to support a request for Mr.
Jaffe's extradition on July 2 and again on July 23, 1981. Mr. Jaffe was returned from
Canada under the circumstances of which Canada complains on September 24, 1981. In
the intervening two months the State Attorney's Office failed to make any further effort
to submit legally sufficient documentation to the Governor's office in support of a request for Mr. Jaffe's extradition.
As no good reason appears why the extradition treaty was not utilized to secure Mr.
Jaffe's return, it is perfectly understandable that the Government of Canada is outraged
by his alleged kidnapping, which Canada considers a violation of the treaty and of international law, as well as an affront to its sovereignty.
I wish to emphasize that Canada is our most important extradition treaty partner
and that the maintenance of the excellent extradition relationship we have had with
Canada is greatly in the law enforcement interest of Florida and the other states, as well
as of the federal government. Indeed, in the last three full calendar years, sixty per cent
of the fugitives surrendered to the United States pursuant to extradition requests made
by states, as opposed to the federal government, were surrendered by Canada.
Moreover, quite apart from law enforcement cooperation, the Jaffe case threatens to
have a generally deleterious effect on our relations with Canada. Canadian authorities
have raised this matter in virtually every recent high level contact between our two nations. It is simply in the national interest that this case no longer be permitted to intrude
upon our relations with one of our most important and highly valued neighbors, allies
and trading partners.
For the foregoing reasons, I urge you to grant parole to Sidney Jaffe.
Id.
3. Id.
4. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T.S. 983, T.I.A.S.
No. 8237 (amended by an exchange of Notes signed at Washington, D.C., on June 28 and July
9,1974) [hereinafter Treaty]. See also I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, 1 EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES §§ 120.1-.29 (1979); Canadian Practice in InternationalLaw During 1970 as Reflected
Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs, 9
CANADIAN

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 299 (1971).

5. The author is not unmindful of the significant contribution to the international law
analysis of the brief prepared by Ms. Jennie Hatfield Lyons and Professor Gerald Morris in
Jaffe v. Wainwright, Habeas Corpus, Case No. 82-1100-CIV-J-M. (amicus curiae) [hereinafter
Lyons-Morris].
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nada's sovereignty rights.6 The officials hoped that early parole would
repair the damaged relations between the two countries as a result of
the forcible abduction that had occurred,
ignoring as Canada per7
ceived it, proper extradition procedures.
Yet the United States officials were unwilling to interfere in the
activities of the state sovereign beyond pen and paper, a response
that is in all probability perplexing to the international community of
nations. Most nations recognize that forcible abduction of a fugitive
from an asylum state impacts upon both national as well as international convention. In a recent letter delivered to the United States
Department of State, the Canadian Government stated its position,
asserting a treaty violation and advocating return of its citizen.' This
letter reaffirmed that international treaties are the sole vehicles for
obtaining fugitives from justice.'
Within the context of this United States-Canadian dispute, this
paper's purpose will be to analyze the concept of external power of
decentralized units (states) from the perspective of the system as de6. See Smith/Shultz Letter, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. Letter from the Canadian Government to the U.S. Dep't of State (No. 567, Nov. 24,
1986) [hereinafter Canadian Letter].
The Embassy of Canada presents its compliments to the Department of State and
has the honour to refer to the case of Mr. Sidney Jaffe.
The Embassy has been instructed to ensure that the U.S. authorities are aware of the
continuing concern of the Canadian authorities about the unsatisfactory state in which
the principles involved in that case have been left, as reflected in numerous communications, both oral and written, following Mr. Jaffe's return to Canada in October 1983.
They stress that Canada's decision not to appeal the dismissal of its petition for habeas
corpus in that case, by the Federal District Court in Jacksonville on January 31, 1986, in
no way derogates from its position that such a kidnapping constitutes a violation of Canada's sovereignty, of the Extradition Treaty with the United States, and of general
principles of customary international law.
At the same time the cooperation of the United States Government in 1983 in assisting in making it possible for Mr. Jaffe to return to Canada and in bringing his kidnappers to justice pursuant to the Extradition Treaty is acknowledged. Messrs. Daniel Kear
and Timm Johnsen were convicted and sentenced in Canada for this offence.
In the view of the Canadian authorities an important factor in the resolution of this
longstanding problem, as indicated in previous communications, would be the taking of
such steps as may be necessary to suspend the pending prosecution of Mr. Jaffe linked to
his kidnapping from Canada, until the State of Florida acquired lawful jurisdiction over
him. It is requested, therefore, that urgent and favorable reconsideration be given to this
matter.
The Embassy of Canada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department
of State the assurances of its highest consideration.
Id. The protest note of Canada is in full compliance with the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432 comment c,
at 304 (Rev. Tent. Draft 1985) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
9. Canadian Letter, supra note 8.
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veloped in the United States. Initially, the paper will focus upon general principles of customary international law impacting upon each
nation's rights and obligations with respect to other nations. The paper then briefly reviews the structure of the United States government, in particular the respective roles of federal and state governments. Following this general background the paper analyzes
international and domestic interpretations of treaty obligations, distinguishing treaty violations from "irregular extraditions." Finally,
this paper examines the extent of external power of American decentralized units within the foregoing framework.
II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A.

International

Extradition is the process by which an asylum state returns a fugitive found within its borders, whether a citizen of that state or not,
to a competent requesting state for trial or other action.1 0 Under
principles of international law, extradition is a substitute for enforcement authorities' execution of their nation's laws in the territory of
another state without that state's consent since the latter violates two
preemptory norms of international law: the sovereignty and equality
of nations."
The Permanent Court of Arbitration considered the concept of
sovereignty in The Island of Palmas Case. 2 The court recognized
"[s]overeignty in the relations between States [as] signif[ying] independence. 1 3 Each state is granted the exclusive right to function as a
state within its own territory without interference by any other
state. 4 The "principle of exclusive competence of a state in regard to
its own territory" thus becomes the court's initial focus in resolving
15
questions of international law.
State sovereignty within the context of twentieth century international relations is described as "the residuum of power which [the
state] possesses within the confines laid down by international law."' 6
10. See generally G. LA

FOREST, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA

(1961); Lyons-Morris,

supra note 5.
11. In Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902), the Court defined extradition as "the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of
its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to
try and punish him, demands the surrender." Id. at 289. Extradition procedure is codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, 3186, 3188-95 (1982).
12. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
13. Id. at 839.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (8th ed. 1977).
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Most states are prepared to restrict their liberty by entering into the
community of nations and participating in the United Nations. An
independent state possesses the right to have exclusive control over
its territory, its population, and its domestic affairs. 7 It also has the
necessary correlative duties of nonintervention into the affairs of another state and noninfringement upon the other state's territorial
sovereignty.' 8
State sovereignty rights are codified in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of
the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter). 9 Article 2(4) prohibits any "threat or use of force" by one nation against the sovereignty of another. 0 Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations from
similarly intruding into a state's domestic affairs." A controversy
arose over whether Article 2(7) also forbids Member States from intervening in the domestic affairs of another state. To resolve the
question, the General Assembly included a specific provision in the
Preamble to the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Declaration). 2
Article 1 of the Declaration emphasizes that "[e]very State has
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international boundaries of another State or, as a means of
solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and
problems concerning frontiers of States. 2 3 Rather, states have an affirmative duty to alleviate international tensions and promote harmony among nations. 4 Moreover, Article 1(b) of the Declaration sets
out the duty of states not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other
nations.2'6 No state may directly or indirectly interfere with either the
internal or external affairs of other nations.2 6 Any armed intervention
17. See generally Feinrider, ExtraterritorialAbductions: A Newly Developing International Standard, 14 AKRON L. REv. 27 (1980).
18. See, e.g., M. McDouGAL & M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1295 (1980) [hereinafter M. McDoUGAL].
19. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4) & (7).
20. Id. art. 2(4). "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
21. Id. art. 2(7). "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State." Id.
22. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 18), U.N. Doc. A/8028 at 121 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration].
23. Id. art. 1.
24. Id.
25. Id. art. 1(b).
26. Id.
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and all other forms of interference "against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements" are declared to be in violation of international law." The Declaration includes within the prohibited forms of interference all coercive economic or political measures designed to subvert a state's sovereignty
rights.2"
Another right of a sovereign nation is that of legal equality.2" The
notion of equality encompasses state competence, mutual respect
among states, equal application of the law, reciprocity, and juridical
equality. 0 The concept of sovereign equality was incorporated into
the U.N. Charter and, as such, is binding on all Members. 3 The Declaration elaborates on the principle of legal equality, 2 defining it as
including the following elements:
(a) States are juridically equal;
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full
sovereignty;
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of
other States;
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of
the State are inviolable;
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop
its political, social, economic and cultural systems;
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good
faith with its international obligations and to live in peace
with other States. 3
The principles of sovereignty and equality are also present in the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(Helsinki Accords). " Under Article I, the participating states agreed
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See The Antelope Case, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.) ("No
principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of
nations.").
30. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OP NATIONS 66 (1963). See also J. PUENTE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED TO FOREIGN STATES 18-28 (1928); I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW

(1971).

31. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1) ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.").
32. Declaration, supra note 22, art. 1(f). "All States enjoy sovereign equality ....
They
have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature." Id.
33. Id.
34. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Dep't
of State, Pub. L. No. 8826, Gen. Foreign Policy Series 298 (Aug. 1975) [hereinafter Helsinki

Accords]. See also

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD
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to "respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well
35
as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty."
Included in this category are the rights to "juridical equality, . . .
3' 6
territorial integrity and . . . freedom and political independence.
Article II is comparable to Articles 1 and 1(b) of the Declaration. 7
Article III prohibits one state's physical invasion of another, 8 while
Article IV demands "respect [of] the territorial integrity" among signatories. 89 Article VI repeats the Declaration's imposition of nonintervention into other states' domestic affairs and proscribes any coercive measures to influence another state's actions. 0
Another fundamental principle of international law is that the
sovereignty of every nation is limited by its own territorial boundaries.4 1 The territorial principle of jurisdiction "remains the most basic
organizing principle in a world order constituted primarily of, and by,
territorially organized states."'' 2 A nation is therefore incompetent to
act within the territorial boundaries of another sovereign state without its consent.43 Hence, while a state may possess jurisdiction for the
ter

HUMAN RIGHTS].

35. Helsinki Accords, supra note 34, art. I.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. II. Under this article, participating States agreed to "refrain in their mutual
relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration." Moreover, "they will refrain
from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights." Id. Compare Declaration, supra note 22, arts. I
& l(b).
38. Helsinki Accords, supra note 34, art. III. Under this article, Participating States
agreed to "regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers . . . and therefore they will refrain
now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers." Id.
39. Id. art. IV. Under article IV, the Parties agreed to "respect the territorial integrity of
each of the participating States." Id.
40. Id. art. VI. Under article VI, the Parties agreed to "refrain from any intervention,
direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations." Id.
Pursuant to this guarantee, the Parties further agreed to "refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest
the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to
secure advantages of any kind." Id. Compare Declaration, supra note 22, art. l(b).
41. Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, Draft Convention on Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 439, 480 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. See
also Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REv. 238 (1931).
42. M. McDOUGAL, supra note 18, at 1295.
43. Sovereignty of a state, as understood in the context of 20th century international relations, means "the residuum of power which it possesses within the confines laid down by international law." J. STARKE, supra note 16, at 113. By entering into the community of nations and
participating in the United Nations, states have restricted their liberty. Being independent, a
state possesses the right to have exclusive control over its territory, its population, and, hence,
its domestic affairs. It also is subject to the necessary correlative duty not to intervene in the
affairs of and not to infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of another state. M. AKEHunsT, A
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purpose of proscribing a particular form of conduct, it may still lack
the jurisdiction to enforce the prohibition in another state. In the
context of the United States, for example, a state may claim jurisdiction to proscribe criminal conduct having an effect felt within United
States territory but occurring outside United States jurisdiction.""
However, the jurisdiction to proscribe should not be confused with
the jurisdiction to enforce.
B.

Domestic Structure

The United States is organized as a federal system with formal
nation-states within a nation state. Historically, little guidance exists
for a complete understanding of the role and function of a state
within the United States. Although not described in any detail in the
federal Constitution, the role of the state and its relationship with
the central government or with other nations can be understood only
through examination of the Constitution, federal judicial review, federal legislation, and executive implementation of national and transnational policies.
The Constitution of 1787 created a federal government which preserved states as separate entities with their own republican forms of
government.' The framers' acceptance of states as separate decenMODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

22 (3d ed. 1977).

This right is codified in articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. Canada and the United
States are both founding members of the United Nations and are therefore both bound by the
Charter provisions contained in Article 2(4), see supra note 20, and Article 2(7), see supra note
21.
The controversy over whether Article 2(7) also forbids member states from intervening in
the domestic affairs of another state led to the inclusion in the Declaration the following
provisions:
Convinced that the strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in the
affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in
peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates
the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which
threaten international peace and security.
Declaration, supra note 22, Preamble. Furthermore, Article 1
[s]olemnly proclaims the following principles:
The Principle that States shall refrain in their internationalrelations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political interdependence of any
State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Id.art. 1(a) (emphasis added). Under this heading the Declaration emphasized that "[e]very
State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international
boundaries of another State or as a means of solving international disputes, frontiers of States."
Rather, states are under a duty to "strive to adopt appropriate measures to reduce international tensions and strengthen confidence among States." Id.
44. M. McDOUGAL, supra note 18, at 1295-96.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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tralized units was a necessary compromise to assure successful formation of the new nation.
The doctrine of federalism established a distinct role for the
states, thereby systemizing a distribution of power between the nation and the states. The Constitution allocated the determination of
the proper distribution of power to a national, or federal, court. Each
conflict must be decided in light of the supremacy of the federal
Constitution."'
The Constitution imposed specific political responsibilities on the
new states.4 7 Included in those judicially-interpreted constitutional
responsibilities were the duties (1) to insure full faith and credit of
sister states' judgments," (2) to limit state authority where it apparently extended beyond that state's boundaries, 9 and (3) to not interfere with the national government's role in international affairs, especially the powers to make treaties, declare war, or promote a national
economy. 50 The subsequent adoption of the post-Civil War amendments 51 further reaffirmed the constitutional mandate to protect basic human rights at both the federal and state levels.
Judicial mandate normally requires all state governments' functions conflicting with properly exercised powers of the national government to give way to national authority.62 Like many other nations,
the American federal system is becoming decentralized in practice
while the formal institutional framework simultaneously retains its
historic centralized form. 3 One may realistically conclude that while
the federal system relies extensively upon the courts for interpretation, the judicial interpretation of constitutional content frequently
64
establishes only ground rules for ensuring the political marketplace.
A state's role within the accepted framework of the Constitution,
therefore, is tied to judicial powers. 5
A state's function as a separate political entity is permitted partly
because the federal government made a political decision not to interfere in matters of local concern 6 Regardless of whether a state's
46. Id. art. VI.
47. Id. art. IV.
48. Id. art. IV, § 1.
49. See, e.g., id. art. IV.
50. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
51. Id. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
52. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 471 U.S. 1079 (1985).
53. See generally Field, Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv. 84, 106-18 (1985).
54. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
55. See Field, supra note 53.
56. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONsrrumONAL LAW § 5-20, at 302 (1978).
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particular activities relate to national, transnational or other state
governments, its role continues to be subject to federal scrutiny and
intervention, particularly when the federal government or the federal
Constitution as interpreted determines intervention is necessary. 57
III. TREATIES
Since the adoption of the Jay Treaty of 1794 providing for the
mutual exchange of prisoners between the United States and Great
Britain, the United States has aspired to the maintenance of world
public order. To accomplish its goal in the world community, the
United States has always viewed shared expectations as being embodied in international agreements6. Thus, on paper at any rate, the
process of decision-making involves the constitutive process of the
world community 59 and as such does not give way to limited domestic
strategies.
A.

InternationalInterpretations

1. General Obligations: Clarification of Goals and Strategies
Most world communities accept in principle the concept of an International Court as an authoritative decision-maker in interpreting
public order. For example, Article 38 of the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) defines the sources the Court may apply in settling a
dispute before it.6 0 Under this provision, the I.C.J. is specifically authorized to consider international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law." Customary international legal norms result from repeated actions of states. The repetition of these actions in
similar circumstances, therefore, becomes the recognized form of conduct within the international community. 2
57. Id.
58. See generally M. McDUOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF
AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).

59.
60.

Id. ch. 3.
International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. See S. REs. No.
196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). See also S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 171-82 (1973). See
generally Lyons-Morris, supra note 5.
61. Id.

62. Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International
Law, in M. McDouGAL, supra note 18, at 86.
Historically, customary norms of international law appear as a result of reiterated actions of States. The element of repetition constitutes the point of departure of its formation. In the majority of cases it is precisely the repetition of certain actions in analogous
situations that leads to such practices becoming a rule of conduct.
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Under Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter, all member states are required to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are
not endangered. 6' 3 The Declaration further elaborates on this obliga-

tion in Article 1(b). 4 Article 1(b) requires states to "seek early and
just settlement of their international disputes by negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement . . . or other

peaceful means of their choice." 6" States "may [not] aggravate [a] situation

. .

. [thereby] endanger[ing] the maintenance of international

peace and security, [but must] act in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations."6 6 Finally, the Declaration requires such disputes to be resolved in light of the principle of sover6
eign equality.

7

The Helsinki Accords reiterate the above obligations and further
require participating states to "endeavor in good faith and spirit of
co-operation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of
international law."6 Moreover, participating states agree to not "aggravate the situation" thereby making "a peaceful settlement of the
dispute more difficult."' 9
One principle of international law employed to encourage mitigation of a particular dispute is the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.
This universally agreed upon doctrine imposes upon states the duty
to fulfill in good faith their assumed obligations.7 0 The U.N. Charter
incorporates this principle through codification of one of the U.N.'s
principal objectives: establishing the conditions necessary to maintain "respect for the obligations arising from treaties .

. . . "'

Fur-

thermore, in order to receive the rights and benefits of U.N. member63. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3).
64. Declaration, supra note 22, art. 1(b).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Helsinki Accords, supra note 34, art. V. There appears to be some disagreement
among international experts as to the exact status of the Helsinki Accords. The general rule is
that an international "agreement" (as opposed to a treaty or convention) is not legally binding
unless the parties intend it to be. Schacter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, in L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (1980). The intention of the parties
must be inferred from the language of the instrument and the attendant circumstances of its
conclusion and adoption, when an agreement fails to state explicitly whether it is nonbinding or
lacks legal force, as is the case of the Helsinki Accords. The declared views of various signatory
states have revealed apparent differences, not only as among themselves but also in the language used by particular states in referring to the Accords over a period of time.
69. Helsinki Accords, supra note 34, art. IV.
70. See L. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 615; M. McDOUGAL, supra note 18, at 119-20.
71.

U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
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ship, members must fulfill their obligations under the Charter. 2
The Declaration effectuates the U.N.'s purposes through more effective application of those objectives within the international community." s The Declaration mandates states to fulfill in good faith

their obligations (1) under the generally recognized principles and
rules of international law, and (2) under valid international agreements conforming74to the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law.

The participating states under the Helsinki Accords also agree to
the above principles. Furthermore, included in this agreement is the
states' obligation to conform their sovereign rights, including passage
of internal laws and regulation, to international law."
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)7 6 provides that treaties in force bind the parties thereto and
mandates that all parties must perform their obligations under the
treaty in good faith. Furthermore, the Convention requires parties
to interpret the treaty's terms in good faith according7 to their ordinary meanings in light of the Convention's objectives.
2. Extradition
As noted previously, extradition is the accepted international legal mechanism applied to effect "the surrender of an individual accused or convicted of a crime by the State within whose territory he
is found to the State under whose laws he is alleged to have committed or to have been convicted of a crime.

'7 9

In theory, extradition can

be accomplished either on the basis of reciprocity or under a treaty.
However, no duty to extradite is recognized under international law
in the absence of treaty.80
The device of extradition was developed precisely to provide an
orderly international mechanism to facilitate international assistance
in criminal matters. A rule allowing the indiscriminate kidnapping of
criminal suspects in foreign jurisdictions would introduce an unbearable tension into the relations between nations, threatening the very
72. Id. art. 2(2).
73. Declaration, supra note 22, Preamble.
74. Id. art. 1(g).
75. Helsinki Accords, supra note 34, art. X.
76. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969),
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
77. Id. art. 26.
78. Id. art. 31.
79. L. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 474.

80. See 2 M. BASSIOUNI, A TREATISE
supra note 18, at 1490.

DOUGAL,

ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
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fabric of international order.
Essentially, the duty to extradite is the act of one country doing a
favor for another."1 Treaties outline the method by which states agree
to depart from general customary international law to the extent expressly stated in the treaty.8 2 The United States government expressly recognized this concept pursuant to its treaty-making capacity. "Treaties are designed to promote U.S. interests by securing
action by foreign governments in a way deemed advantageous to the
United States. '"83

B. Domestic Interpretations
1. Function and Character of Extradition Treaties
Unfortunately, what United States diplomats agree to in the international arena is not always applied by domestic courts which perceive their power to stem from Article VI of the federal Constitution.
Therefore, it is not surprising that United States courts have long
recognized the principle of no duty to extradite.84 In Factor v. Laubenheimer, the Supreme Court reiterated that, absent a treaty, no
right to extradition exists.8 " Because it is a discretionary duty, the
treaty rather than customary international law binds signatories.8 6
Generally, both the United States and Canada do not grant extradition in the absence of a treaty. United States courts continue to
recognize this principle. In Ramos v. Diaz, a United States district
court stated that the right to demand extradition and the duty to
surrender become operative only under a treaty.87 "[I]n the absence
of statutory or treaty provision therefor, no authority exists in any
branch of the government to surrender a fugitive criminal to a foreign government."88
The function of extradition treaties in the context of settled international law was authoritatively described in two Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Rauscher 9 and Ker v. Illinois.e0 Both cases
81.

82.
83.
Manual,
84.
85.
86.
87.

2 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 80, at 309.
L. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 70-71.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EXERCISE OF THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 311 (Foreign Affairs
No. 175, rev. ed. 1966).
Evans, supra note 1, at 79-80.
290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
Id.
179 F. Supp. 459, 460-61 (S.D. Fla. 1959) ("The right of a foreign power to demand

the extradition of one accused of crime and the correlative duty to surrender him exists only
when created by treaty ....
88. Id. at 461.
89. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
90. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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were decided on the same day, pertain to the same subject matter,
and were written by the same Justice. The cases, therefore, must be
read as companion decisions.
Rauscher recognized that under international law an absolute
right exists of one nation to grant asylum to fugitives from other nations. 91 The Court found that, prior to enactment of extradition treaties, no country was obligated to return another country's fugitives.9
Nations had discretion in these matters because, without a well-established rule of international law, the principle of comity
governed.s
The function of extradition treaties is to create exceptions to the
right to refuse to surrender fugitives which otherwise must be
respected by other nations, including the United States. 4 In Ker, the
Supreme Court delineated this essential function of extradition treaties and specified procedural requirements for proper extradition. 5
These treaties, therefore, impose a limited restriction upon the asylum state's ability to protect the fugitive from removal.96
2. Treaty Violations vs. Irregular Extraditions
Under United States law, treaties bind nations rather than individuals. An extradition treaty violation, therefore, is an act of one
nation which interferes with or abrogates the right of another nation
to grant asylum. Such a violation may take one of two forms. First, it
may infringe on a particular provision in an extradition treaty. 97 Second, a violation may occur from disregard of the total treaty, such as
a governmental taking of a fugitive in a manner inconsistent with a
nation's absolute right to grant asylum.9 8 Thus, Rauscher recognized
91.
92.

119 U.S. at 419.
Id. at 411-12.

Prior to these treaties, and apart from them, it may be stated, as the general result of the
writers upon international law, that there was no well-defined obligation on one country
to deliver up such fugitives to another; and though such delivery was often made, it was
upon the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the government whose action
was invoked; and it has never been recognized as among those obligations of one government towards another which rest upon established principles of international law.

Id.
93. Id.
94. See Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 480 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Donnely v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1934) (it is lawful under international law for
one nation to refuse to surrender a fugitive to another nation absent an extradition treaty). See
also Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
95. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442.
96. Id.
97. See generally Feinrider, supra note 17.
98. Id.
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that an extradition treaty must be viewed against the background of
a settled doctrine of international law; 99 for example, a person extradited pursuant to a treaty may be tried only for the offense for which
he was returned. 10 0 The Court held that the United States failed to
abide by this principle in trying Rauscher for an offense other than
the one for which he was extradited. 101 The federal government
therefore violated the extradition treaty even though the treaty involved in Rauscher contained no express provision prohibiting such
an action. 02
In another case,' the Court held imprisoning a person on a sentence imposed before he became a fugitive, rather than trying him on
the offense for which he was extradited, violated the treaty despite
the lack of an express prohibition.10 4 Both this case and Rauscher
concluded that the specific governmental action violated the relevant
treaty because it disregarded the manifest scope and purpose of an
extradition treaty between civilized states: to provide for the exclusive manner of rendering fugitives among signatory nations.0 ,
Because treaties involve the recognition of the rights of nations,
only a government's actions can constitute a treaty violation sufficient to strip a court of jurisdiction. 0 6 In the United States, therefore, a violation of an extradition treaty can result only from (1) actions of federal officials, (2) actions of state officials, or (3) actions of
those persons acting at the instigation of and/or under color of state
authority.
In Ker, for instance, a Pinkerton detective abducted the petitioner from Peru and brought him back to the United States.10 7 The
current de facto military leader of Peru provided officers to assist in
Ker's capture. 0 8 Ker argued the treaty gave him a personal right of
asylum in Peru which he asserted defeated the court's jurisdiction.10 9
The Ker Court, however, held this individual abducted from Peru
99.

Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 429-30.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 422, 430.
103. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907).
104. Id.
105. See also Note, Due Process Rights of Foreign National Defendant Abducted from
Native Country by Federal Agents, United States v. Quesada, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 723 (1976).
106. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443 (Kidnapping was "without any pretense of authority under the
treaty or from the Government of the United States.").
107. Id. at 442. The detective went to Peru with the necessary extradition papers, but was
unable to deliver them because there was at the time no government to present them to. He
did, however, deliver the papers to the de facto military leader of Peru. Brief of the Attorney
General of Illinois, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
108. 119 U.S. at 442.
109. Id. at 443.
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could not object to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court based on a
violation of the extradition treaty. " The federal government did not
authorize the abduction."' The treaty involved was not self-executing with respect to jurisdiction, and Peru lodged neither an express
nor implied protest. " 2 Under the circumstances, therefore, the treaty
never became operative." 3 Because no treaty was involved, no violation occurred. Ker had merely asserted a naked personal right to asylum, a right neither recognized by American courts nor contemplated
by extradition treaties." 4 This rationale became the basis for the socalled Ker-Frisbiedoctrine.""
The Ker-Frisbiedoctrine states that "the power of a court to try a
person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he [was] brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "116
However, it is clearly limited by the context in which it arises." 7 The
doctrine merely teaches that a fugitive has no personal right to asylum sufficient to defeat in personam jurisdiction derived from the
defendant's actual presence in court." 8
In Rauscher, the companion case to Ker,"9 the Court recognized
that a treaty violation bars personal jurisdiction. 2 0 The Court held a
treaty to which the United States is a party is the law of the land.
Therefore, courts must take judicial notice of its provisions and,
where appropriate, must enforce them.' 2 ' Because Rauscher was
brought to trial in violation of a treaty, the only appropriate remedy
was to return him to the country from which he was taken until he
could be tried in accordance with the treaty.'2 2 The Rauscher Court
determined the federal government improperly demanded the petitioner's return. 123 Rauscher did not suggest that the British government had lodged a formal protest. However, the Court sustained his
110. Id. at 442-43.
111. Id. at 443.
112. Id. at 442-44.
113. Id. at 443.
114. Id.
115. See generally Ker, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)
(alleged violation of federal Anti-Kidnapping Statute rather than extradition treaty).
116. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
117. Id. at 522-23.
118. See generally Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders
Abroad: Extradition, Abduction, or IrregularRendition?, 57 OR. L. REv. 51 (1977).
119. Rauscher was decided the same day as Ker; therefore, it is clear the Court recognized
Ker as involving an issue quite different from the treaty violation in Rauscher.
120. 119 U.S. 407, 418 (1886).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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4 Apparently, it found the
objection to the jurisdiction of the court."
125
implied.
or
presumed
protest to be
In United States v. Postal,2 6 the Fifth Circuit also had the opportunity to consider the issue of a treaty violation's effect on a
court's jurisdiction. 127 The court first determined the defendant's arrest violated a, United States treaty obligation.128 It stated that the
defendant's contention that the violation deprived the court of juris-

124.
125.

Id. at 419-20.
The Court stated:

The Treaty of 1842 being, therefore, the supreme law of the land, of which the courts are
bound to take judicial notice, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of
persons growing out of that treaty, we proceed to inquire, in the first place, so far as
pertinent to the questions certified by the circuit judges, into the true construction of the
treaty. We have already seen that, according to the doctrine of publicists and writers on
international law, the country receiving the offender against its laws from another country had no right to proceed against him for any other offense than that for which he had
been delivered up. This is a principle which commends itself as an appropriate adjunct
to the discretionary exercise of the power of rendition, because it can hardly be supposed
that a government which was under no treaty obligation, nor any absolute obligation of
public duty, to seize a person who had found an asylum within its bosom and turn him
over to another country for trial would be willing to do this, unless a case was made of
some specific offense, of a character which justified the government in depriving the
party of his asylum. It is unreasonable that the country of the asylum should be expected
to deliver up such person to be dealt with by the demanding government without any
limitation, implied or otherwise, upon its prosecution of the party. In exercising its discretion, it might be very willing to deliver up offenders against such laws as were essential to the protection of life, liberty, and person, while it would not be willing to do this
on account of minor misdemeanors, or of a certain class of political offenses in which it
would have no interest or sympathy. Accordingly, it has been the policy of all governments to grant an asylum to persons who have fled from their homes on account of
political disturbances, and who might be there amenable to laws framed with regard to
such subjects, and to the personal allegiance of the party. ...
It is, therefore very clear that this treaty did not intend to depart in this respect from
the recognized public law which had prevailed in the absence of treaties, and that it was
not intended that this treaty should be used for any other purpose than to secure the
trial of the person extradited for one of the offenses enumerated in the treaty. This is
not only apparent from the general principle that the specific enumeration of certain
matters and things implies the exclusion of all others, but the entire face of the treaty,
including the processes by which it is to be carried into effect, confirms this view of the
subject. It is unreasonable to suppose that any demand for rendition, framed upon a
general representation to the government of the asylum, (if we may use such an expression) that the party for whom the demand was made was guilty of some violation of the
laws of the country which demanded him, without specifying any particular offense with
which he was charged, and even without specifying an offense mentioned in the treaty,
would receive any serious attention; and yet such is the effect of the construction that
the party is properly liable to trial for any other offense than that for which he was
demanded, and which is described in the treaty.
Id. at 419-21.
126. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
127. Id. at 868.
128. Id. at 873.
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diction could be dismissed only if "it concerned a mere violation of
law not embodied in a treaty binding on the United States."", The
court concluded Ker-Frisbie was inapplicable, and applied the rule
advanced in Ford v. United States and Cook v. United States.130
The Postal court, however, did not conclude its analysis on this
note. Instead, it explained that "Cook and Ford must be viewed in
the fuller context of treaty law to appreciate their reasoning, for it is
not true that every treaty to which the United States is a party acts
to limit the jurisdiction of its courts."'' Only those treaties which are
self-executing or "given effect by congressional legislation" may deprive United States courts of jurisdiction. " " Because it found this
treaty neither self-executing nor subject to specific enabling legislation, the court retained jurisdiction over the defendants. 3 '
34
In Ford,1
the defendant contested the validity of the seizure of
the British vessel Quadra along with her officers, crew and cargo of
liquor.138 Ford argued the seizure occurred on the high seas beyond
the zone prescribed by the treaty with Great Britain specifying the
conditions for proper seizures, and thus, the seizure was invalid and
the court lacked jurisdiction. " 6 The Solicitor General argued that,
under Ker, even if seizure did violate the treaty, its validity did not
deprive the court of jurisdiction.' 37 The Court held Ker inapplicable

because "[h]ere a treaty of the United States [was] directly involved,
and the question [was] quite different."'3 8
The Court did not directly address Ford's claim, however, but instead held that his claim could not prevail. 39 The Court stated:
The issue whether the ship was seized within the prescribed
limit did not affect the question of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. It only affected the right of the court to hold their
persons for trial. It was necessarily preliminary to that trial.
The proper way of raising the issue of fact of the place of
seizure was by a plea to the jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction must precede the plea of not guilty. Such a plea was
not filed. The effect of the failure to file it was to waive the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 874-75.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. at 876.
273 U.S. 593 (1927).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id.
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In view of the Court's statement that Ker was inapplicable, one
may reasonably infer that, had Ford properly raised the issue of jurisdiction, the Court would have found personal jurisdiction lacking if
a treaty violation had existed. The Court resolved this issue in
Cook"" when it declined to recognize the procedural waiver which
had prevented the Ford Court from addressing the question of a
treaty violation's effect on a court's jurisdiction. 4"
In Cook, the British vessel Mazel-Tov was seized at a point beyond the limit set by a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain.14 3 The treaty was the same as the one involved in Ford.44
Cook argued the seizure's invalidity deprived the court of jurisdiction. ' The government, on the other hand, argued that the validity
of the seizure was immaterial; once the vessel arrived at port, the
court acquired jurisdiction."4 6
The Court analyzed the government's argument as one based on
Ker and held the doctrine inapplicable.1 47 The invalid seizure did not
arise from the government's failure to authorize the particular person
to seize the ship at that place. Rather, the impropriety arose because
the government itself lacked authority to seize beyond the treatyimposed territorial limits. The treaty specified conditions for proper
seizure. Therefore, no legitimate adjudication could occur subsequent
to a seizure violating the treaty's provisions. 4 8
Ker and the cases which apply its principle do not involve treaty
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
288 U.S. 102 (1933).
Id. at 122.
Id. at 108.
Id. See also Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
Cook, 288 U.S. at 108.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121. The Court stated:

The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by one
upon whom the government had not conferred authority to seize at the place where the
seizure was made. The objection is that the government itself lacked power to seize, since
by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority. The Treaty
fixes the conditions under which a "vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the
United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in accordance with" the applicable laws. Thereby, Great Britain agreed that adjudication may follow a rightful
seizure. Our government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to
subject the vessel to our laws. To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure
would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty.
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violations. What they do share is a common thread: The country
from which the fugitive was abducted failed to object to and, in some
cases, participated in the abduction.'4 9 This type of action is considered an "irregular extradition" and does not involve a treaty.5 0 Unless a protest is lodged by the country from which the fugitive is abducted, the treaty is not called into operation; hence, no treaty
violation exists.
In United States v. Darby, 5 ' for example, the British defendants
were brought before the court after allegedly being abducted by
American and Honduran officials under the guise of a Honduran deportation.'5 2 Darby clearly involves an irregular extradition. Because
both parties to the extradition treaty agreed to the procedure, the
treaty was not called into operation; therefore, an irregular extradition rather than a treaty violation occurred.
The Ker-Frisbie progeny have consistently recognized this distinction between an irregular extradition and a treaty violation.' 5 3
Any act of cooperation or acquiescence clearly vitiates any violation
of a state's sovereignty resulting from the forcible abduction of a fugitive from that state. 5 4 In addition, apparently the offended state
must affirmatively object to the action to avoid an accusation of acquiescence.' 5 5 This is so perhaps because of the doctrine of mala captus bene detentus which, in an international context, is permitted in
most states. 156
149. See generally Feinrider, supra note 17.
150. Id.
151. 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 1528.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring)
(stated in reference to the court's decision to apply Ker-Frisbiethat "there is a very strong
policy which would be operative if the abduction here were from an objecting country. . . or in
violation of a treaty") (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1983); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.
1975) (The court held Lugan's failure to "allege either Argentina or Bolivia in any way protested or even objected to his abduction" was fatal to his reliance on the treaties with those
countries. The court further explained that "any rights arising out of such treaty provisions are,
under international law, those of the states and . . . individual rights are only derivative
through the states"; hence, failure to object precludes any violation.); HarvardResearch, supra
note 41, art. 16 ("It only remains to be emphasized that by no means every irregularity in the
recovery of a fugitive from criminal justice is a 'recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention.' If the state in which the fugitive is found acquiesces or
agrees, through its officers or agents, to a surrender accomplished even in the most informal
and expeditious way, there is no element of illegality.").
154. See United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
155. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 118, at 66.
156. But see Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to the Jurisdiction of the Court, or Mala
Captus Bene Detentus? Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q. 341 (1986).
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The question becomes what happens when a nation refuses to adhere to the doctrine of mala captus bene detentus. Does an extradition treaty preserve that nation's territorial integrity as well as its
157
absolute right to grant and maintain an asylum to a fugutive?
More specifically, would Canada allow the kidnapping on her territory of fugitives from justice? 58 Judging from recent events, the
question must be answered in the negative. As such, it is suggested
that Ker-Frisbie and mala captus bene detentus are of little use in a
defense against Canadian protests.
The case in question that established through its submissions Canada's position with respect to the United States-Canadian Extradition Treaty and its relationship to Ker-Frisbie is Canada v. Wainwright' 5 According to the Canadian government, the United States
government is obligated to assist Canada in vindicating its absolute
right to grant one Sidney Jaffe asylum by commencing proceedings
leading to his return to Canada. Canada asserts that the federal government's preeminent role in foreign relations as well as the Constitution's supremacy clause provide the rationale for United States' application to federal courts for relief on behalf of Canada. The
Canadian government maintains that Ker-Frisbie is inapplicable in
such an action because the United States government would be vindicating Canada's rights rather than Jaffe's.'6 0
A.

Factual Setting

According to the Canadian government in Wainwright,"' the factual setting involves a Mr. Sidney Jaffe who was, at the time of his
abduction, a citizen of Canada 6 2 and a resident of Toronto. 63 Jaffe
157. This concept is well recognized in United States domestic law. See Ker, 119 U.S. 436,
442 (1886); Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886).
158. S. WILLIAMS & J. CASTEL, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS 145 n.4 (1981).
159. See Memorandum of Law of the Dep't of Justice of Canada, Jaffe v. Florida, Nos.
82-204, 82-205 & 82-242 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983); Memorandum of Law In the Matter of the
Application of Canada for a Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding detention of Sidney L. Jaffe, a
Canadian Citizen, No. 83-661-CIV-J-16 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 1983 and Nov. 30, 1983).
160. Memorandum of Law of the Department of Justice of Canada, Jaffe v. Florida, Nos.
82-204, 82-205, and 82-242 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982), at 21.
161. In the Matter of the Application of Canada for a Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding
detention of Sidney L. Jaffe, a Canadian Citizen, No. 83-661-CIV-J-16 (M.D. Fla. June 27 &
Nov. 30 1983).
162. Jaffe became a Canadian citizen in June 1981. Memorandum of Law of the Department of Justice of Canada, Jaffe v. Florida, Nos. 82-204, 82-205, and 82-242 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1982), at 2.
163. Jaffe emigrated from the United States to Canada in 1970 where he acquired landed

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss2/2

22

Baldwin: Some Observations
Concerning
External
Power of Decentralized Unit
EXTERNAL
POWER
OF STATES

19861

was involved in many land transactions in Florida and on August 8,
1980, he was arrested for alleged violations of the Florida Land Sales
Practices Act. On April 2, 1981, he was charged with twenty-eight
felony counts of unlawful land sales practices. Jaffe was ordered to
appear for a pre-trial conference to be held on May 6, 1981, and bail
was set at $137,500. Jaffe obtained bail through a bonding agency
and signed an agreement obligating him to remain in Florida or California. This agreement also authorized bondsmen to secure Jaffe's return "in case of disobedience or absence from the court when ordered
to appear.' 164
In Jaffe's absence on May 6, 1981, he was charged with failing to
appear for the pre-trial conference. His attorney told the court that
he had informed his client that his presence was unnecessary. Trial
was set for May 18, 1981. Again, Jaffe failed to appear. His absence
was ostensibly due to medical problems. The judge ordered the
posted bond estreated and instructed the local State Attorney to file
a motion for the forfeiture of the bond to the county, which was subsequently ordered. Additionally, the judge issued a bench warrant for
Jaffe and ordered the State Attorney to initiate extradition procedures to return Jaffe from Canada.16 5
Some time later, an attorney for the bonding agency met with the
two prosecutors in the Jaffe case and a State Attorney's investigator.
The state representatives told the bonding agency's attorney that extradition efforts had failed. When the bonding company's attorney
rejected the suggestion that the agency itself secure Jaffe's return,
the three men proposed that the bonding company's attorney file on
the agency's behalf a motion to vacate the final forfeiture judgment
promising to support the motion in court. 6 6
The motion stated inter alia that vacating the judgment would
create a financial incentive for efforts to return Jaffe to the court's
jurisdiction within a reasonable time. The motion was supported by a
member of the State Attorney's office but opposed by the county.1 17
However, the state investigator had previously informed the trial
judge of the unsuccessful extradition efforts. The judge responded by
vacating the judgment and ordering the agency to produce Jaffe
within ninety days and to pay the amount of the still forfeited bond
into escrow. This order was allegedly issued on September 18, 1981;
however, it was not filed until September 24, 1981, one day after
immigrant status. Id.
164. Id. at 7-8.
165. Id. at 8-10.
166. Id. at 10-11.
167. Id. at 11. On a previous occasion the judge denied a similar motion.
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Jaffe's abduction. On December 18, 1981, the judge "rewarded" the
agency by ordering a refund of $37,500, while retaining as forfeited
the remaining $100,000.111
Subsequent to this judicial activity, both the bonding company's
attorney and the judge became aware of the State Attorney's failure
to file properly prepared documents requesting Jaffe's extradition
from Canada. Defective extradition requests were twice filed with the
Governor and both times they were returned for corrections. However, corrected documents were never filed. Once the Governor's office was informed of Jaffe's abduction, the extradition file was closed
without a decision on the feasibility of extradition. At this point in
time, the State of Florida did not formally request the United States
government or the Canadian government for Jaffe's extradition.1 69
Once the State Attorney and judge provided the appropriate incentive, the bonding agency retained the services of Timm Johnsen
and Daniel Kear to secure Jaffe's return to Florida. 1 ' These men
were professional bail bond recovery agents (bounty hunters).""
Meanwhile, the state investigator continued to play an important role
in Jaffe's abduction. Not only did he recommend Johnsen's services
provided Johnsen with Jaffe's description
to the agency, but he 17also
2
and Toronto address.

Flashing a badge with an emblem of the State of Florida and a
card stating, "Florida Bail Recovery, Fugitive Investigation Division,
Agent No. 2784," Johnsen and Kear forcibly subdued Jaffe and manacled him within their automobile. Despite continuous verbal objections and physical resistance, the two men managed to pass through
United States customs by informing officials that they were returning
a prisoner. Once safely in Niagra Falls, New York, Johnsen and Kear
allowed Jaffe to make a telephone call. He phoned his son who
alerted the Niagara Falls Sheriff's Office. Police officers subsequently
surrounded Johnsen, Kear and Jaffe; whereupon Johnsen showed
them the judge's bench warrant. After consulting with a New York
State District Attorney, the police allowed the three to continue on
their way to Florida. After Jaffe's incarceration in the county jail, the
judge was informed of Jaffe's successful return." 3
Over his objections to the court's jurisdiction, Jaffe was tried in
October 1981 for failure to appear for both the pre-trial conference
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 15-18.
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and for trial. He was acquitted of the former charge and convicted of
the latter. In November 1981 Jaffe was tried and convicted on
twenty-eight counts of unlawful land sales practices. 7 4
Sentencing took place on February 11, 1982. The judge rejected
Jaffe's motion to dismiss the charges and to vacate the verdicts on
the ground that his presence had been obtained in violation of his
right to due process. The State Attorney also refused the United
States Department of State's request for postponement of the sentencing hearing. The State Department suggested that Florida authorities should first consider the "serious questions of international
law" and foreign policy involved. 17 5 Instead, the court sentenced Jaffe
7

7
to a total of 145 years in prison1 6 and a total fine of $152,250.1
1 78
appeal.
Jaffe's convictions and sentences are presently under
Timm Johnsen and Daniel Kear were charged on October 30,
1981, by the Toronto police with kidnapping (forcibly abducting)
Jaffe. Canadian authorities filed an appropriate extradition request
for the men, both of whom were found extraditable.179 They are presently free on bond pending habeus corpus actions. i s
Canada's Department of External Affairs instructed the Canadian
Embassy in Washington to protest the infringement of Canadian sovereignty and contravention of specific international law principles.
The Embassy requested that Jaffe be released immediately and returned to Canada. This request was reiterated several times. On
March 14, 1982, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs restated the request for Jaffe's return with then United States Secretary of State Haig. It was subsequently mentioned in an April 13,
1982, meeting between Canada's Minister of Justice and the United
States Attorney General.' 8 ' The only positive response to Canada's
repeated requests was an investigation in Florida by a United States
Deputy Assistant Attorney General. He merely reviewed the public
court documents and informed the Canadian Embassy that insufficient evidence existed to warrant the Justice Department's interven-

174. Id. at 18-19.
175. Id. at 19.
176. The prison terms were as follows: five years for each of six counts of illegal land sales
practices and for failure to appear at trial, to be served consecutively, and five years for each of
28 counts of illegal land sales practices, to be served concurrently with the above. Id. at 19.
177. The fines consisted of a $5,000 fine for each of the 28 counts and for failure to appear at trial, increased by a maximum $250 surcharge permitted by Florida law. Id.
178. Id. at 20.
179. See Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Johnsen, No. 8248-M-01 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 1982).
180. Memorandum of Law of the Department of Justice of Canada, Jaffe v. Florida, Nos.
82-204, 82-205, and 82-242 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982), at 3.
181. Id. at 3-4.
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tion in the matter.' 8 2

B. Analysis of States' Rights and Individual Rights
1. Federal Preeminence
The conduct of foreign relations is an exclusive federal power
under the United States Constitution, preempting state interference
with implementation of a uniform national foreign policy.' 8 In
Zschernig v. Miller,18 4 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of a
state's application of its probate laws which conflicted with federal
exercise of treaty obligations. 8 5 The Court held that where state
"laws conflict with a treaty[, the laws] must bow to the superior federal policy."' 86
Furthermore, even without the existence of a treaty, state laws
may not violate national foreign policy.'

7

The Zschernig Court noted

that seemingly minor controversies arising "from real or imagined
wrongs to another [country's] subjects inflicted or permitted by a
government" may result in serious breaches of international relations, even war.188 The Oregon law posed no such threat; however,
the Court held the law sufficiently intrusive to abrogate exclusive
89
federal power to establish a uniform national foreign policy.'
The Supreme Court again dealt with the issue of federal preemption in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.'90 Justice Harlan
stated for the Court:
The act of state doctrine

. . .

arises out of the basic relation-

ships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions
in the area of international relations . .

.

.Whatever consid-

erations are thought to predominate, it is plain that the
problems involved are uniquely federal in nature. If federal
authority, in this instance this Court, orders the field of judicial competence in this area for the federal courts, and the
state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 4.
See Kolvrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 441 (citing Kolvrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961)).
Id. at 440-41.
Id. at 441 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).
Id. at 440-41.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the
subject . ...191

In the international context, Sabbatino reaffirmed exclusive application of federal law. 192 Therefore, states may not rely on the doctrine established in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 93 Individual
states' "parochial interpretations" could easily conflict with the
"competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community."

9

4

The Sabbatino Court then concluded that the

19
act of state doctrine must be determined according to federal law.
It cited various constitutional and statutory provisions which indirectly support this position by reflecting a concern for uniformity in
this country's dealings with foreign nations and indicating a desire to
give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal
institutions. 9" The federal government's exclusive power to enter
into treaties with foreign governments is but one example of federal
preeminence.

2. United States-Canada Extradition Treaty
Since 1842 international agreements have governed the rendition
of fugitives from justice between the United States and Canada; the
1971 Treaty on Extradition is merely the most recent. 97 The advantage which both countries sought in concluding the Extradition
Treaty was more effective cooperation between them in repressing
crime."' The explicit "provision for the reciprocal extradition of offenders" effectuates this cooperation.' 99 Article 2 specifies the offenses for which one may be extradited,0 0 while Article 3(3) delineates other conditions under which extradition may occur.20 '
According to Article 2, the two states agreed that persons shall be
191. Id. at 423-24.
192. Id. at 424.
193. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
194. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424-25.
195. Id. at 427.
196. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1936); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3 & 10; id. art. II, §§ 2 & 3; id. art. III, § 2;
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2), 1333, 1350-51 (1966); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine - Its
Relation to Private and Public International Law, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1278, 1296-97 n.123
(1962).
197. Treaty, supra note 4.
198. See id. Preamble.
199. See G. LA FOREST, supra note 10, at 123-26.
200. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2.
201. Id. art. 3(3).
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extradited for offenses listed in Schedule 111.202 Canada's implementing legislation provides for extradition irrespective of the Treaty, including an existing extradition treaty which does not include all of
the crimes listed in Schedule 111.2" s But Part II provides that all ele-

ments of the extradition process under the Treaty are applied in the
same manner as if they were specifically delineated between the two
countries. °4
Part II, however, does not become operative unless the Governor
General declares by proclamation that it is in force regarding the specific foreign state.2 05 Therefore, Canada argued that it does not recognize as legitimate the surrender for any other crime or by any other
method than that set out in the Treaty. This certainly has been the
position of the Canadian government throughout the negotiations between Canada and the United States in extradition-kidnapping
issues.2 6
The Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States
requires no legislation to make it operative. 20 7 The objective of the
202. Id. art. 2.
203. The Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1970, C. E-21, Part II.
204. Id. § 37(2). Part II expressly states that "[t]he arrest, committal, detention, surrender and conveyance out of Canada of a fugitive offender" under this section is governed by all
the provisions of Part I. Therefore, all the steps and procedures applicable to extradition under
treaty also apply "in the same manner and to the same extent as they would apply if the said
crimes were included and specified in an extradition arranged between Her Majesty and the
foreign state." Id.
205. Id. § 35(1).
206. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Att'y, W.D. Wash. (Feb. 19, 1985). See
also U.S. Judge Frees CanadianMan after Abduction, Toronto (Canada) Globe & Mail, Feb.
20, 1985, at 8, col. 1; U.S. Bounty Hunters Get Bail, Toronto (Canada) Globe & Mail, Feb. 21,
1985, at 5, col. 1.
207. A treaty is self-executing if it operates in and of itself without aid of any legislative
provision. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). The tests or criteria for a selfexecuting treaty include considering whether it reads like a statute, Comment, Criteria for
Self-Executing Treaty, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 238, or its subject matter indicates a necessity for
legislation. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979). Extradition treaties are generally considered self-executing. See Henry, When Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REV.
776 (1928). In order to be self-executing, a treaty must manifest an intention to become effective as domestic law, superseding conflicting prior law at the moment it becomes binding on the
signatories. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 141 (1965); Evans, Some Aspects of
the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45 Am.Soc. INT'L PROCEEDINGS 66 (1951).
The question whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation, RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 8, § 154(1), and, as in all matters of interpretation, the intent of the
parties to the agreement must be discerned in order to carry out their manifest purpose. Board
of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Pernanasa, 307 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 961 (1963). The parties' intent may be construed from the language of the treaty. Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809, 813 (5th Cir. 1964).
The Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States is clearly self-executing. It
is a bilateral contract establishing mutual rights and obligations and addressing a specific problem: "to make more effective the co-operation of the two countries in the repression of crime by
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Treaty is to make more effective the cooperation of the two countries
in the repression of crime.2 0° The provisions of the Treaty effectively
implement this objective. It neither requires legislation to fulfill its
objectives, nor legislation to make its provisions operative.2 0 9 Furthermore, the Treaty is bilateral with clearly defined mutual
obligations.
3.

Treaty Violation's Effect on Court Jurisdiction

As noted previously, under international law the conferring of
asylum is a right rather than a power which each nation has and
which other nations must respect. i0 Asylum is not an individual
right or privilege. 211 Nevertheless, federal courts recognize that an individual in a representative capacity may assert a treaty violation as
a bar to jurisdiction if the asylum nation lodges either an express or
implied objection that its right to grant asylum has been violated. 1 2
making provision for the reciprocal extradition of offenders." Treaty, supra note 4, Preamble.
The Treaty's language is unambiguous: "Each Contracting Party agrees to extradite to the
other, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions described in this Treaty, persons
found in its territory .... " Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
208. Treaty, supra note 4, Preamble.
209. Id. art. 2.

210.

See T. LAWRENCE,

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

199-207 (7th ed. 1923). See

also Lyons-Morris, supra note 5.
211. Ker, 119 U.S. 436, 442 (1886).
212. In Rauscher, the Court held that:
If the party, however, is under arrest, and desires a more speedy remedy in order to
secure his release, a writ of habeas corpus from one of the federal judges or federal
courts, issued on the ground that he is restrained of this liberty in violation of . . . a
treaty of the United States, will bring him before a federal tribunal, where the truth of
the allegation can be inquired into, and, if it be well founded, he will be discharged.
119 U.S. 407, 431 (1886). Accord Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899); Cohn v. Jones, 100 F.
639 (S.D. Iowa 1900).
Rauscher also set out the rule of speciality which operates to prohibit extradition from a
requested state or to prevent trial in a requesting state for any offense other than that upon
which the extradition request was granted. In particular, the Court held that:
[I]t is impossible to conceive of the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case for any other
purpose than that mentioned in the treaty and ascertained by the proceedings under
which the party is extradited, without an implication of fraud upon the rights of the
party extradited and of bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition.
119 U.S. at 421-22.

Further, in Cohn the Court held:

If it be true that the petitioner in this case was tried for an offense other and different
from that for which he was surrendered by the Canadian authorities, then it is clear that
the State Court had no jurisdiction over his person, and the whole proceedings based
upon the indictment are void, and of no effect.
100 F. at 641-42.
Following the logic in Rauscher, it can be argued that if the individual is not delivered up
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Thus, in Rauscher, the Supreme Court examined the treaty's "true
construction" prior to determining Rauscher's individual rights under
that treaty.2 13 The Court acknowledged that the receiving country
may not initiate proceedings on charges other than those for which a
fugitive is returned.1 It found, however, that no country could reasonably be expected to return a person unless the offense was of such
a nature to justify depriving that individual of his asylum. 218 The signatories to this treaty did not intend for it to become operative under
conditions other than those specified.216 The requesting nation must
carefully delineate the reasons for a rendition demand.2 17
If Canada correctly assessed the facts in Wainwright, then apparently Ker-Frisbie is of little use. In Ker, the petitioner argued that he
had a personal right to asylum because of the mere existence of an
extradition treaty.21 Wainwright involves the jurisdiction of the
court subsequent to the violation of a treaty limiting the manner in
which a fugitive may be returned to the requesting state. Furthermore, in Ker, the de facto government assisted in Ker's capture. No
Peruvian protest ensued regarding Ker's abduction.21 9 For instance,
unlike Canada, Peru made no efforts to charge the abductor with kidnapping. The Supreme Court found Peru's failure to object to Ker's
abduction precluded any assertion of a treaty violation.220
In Wainwright, Canada argued that it had no knowledge of the
kidnapping and therefore could not acquiesce in it. Once Canada became aware of the action, it filed numerous objections through official
diplomatic channels. In addition, Canada initiated proceedings in
under the provisions of a treaty which is in force, the individual cannot be tried at all, especially in the case where extradition is attempted and fails. See Cardozo, When Extradition
Fails,Is Abduction the Solution?, 55 Am.J. INT'L L. 127 (1961). See also Minnesota Canal &
Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N.W. 395 (1907) (court may refuse to authorize any
proceeding which would result in violation of a treaty); Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92,
234 S.W. 79 (1921) (holding that an extradition may be set up as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted in disregard thereof).
It would be an anomaly that in Rauscher, the defendant came "clothed with the protection
which the nature of such extradition proceedings and the true construction of the Treaty gave
him." Ker, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886). Yet, an individual kidnapped in violation of the treaty
(and perhaps in a deliberate attempt to circumvent the protections of the treaty) should be
held by the courts to be "clothed with no rights which a proceeding under the treaty could have
given him and no duty which this country owes to Peru or to him under the treaty." Id.
213. 119 U.S. at 419.
214. Id. at 419-20.
215. Id. at 420.
216. Id. at 420-21.
2i7. Id. at 421.
218. 119 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
219. Brief of Att'y Gen. of Ill., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See also Note, supra
note 105.
220. 119 U.S. at 441-42. See also Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
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United States courts. Canada also implicated international law.
Therefore, Canada neither assisted in the abduction, nor acquiesced
in the continued exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. This is a
critical distinction because Canada's protest triggered the Treaty's
involvement.22 ' Absent official protest, 222 any right the state may
have under the treaty is waived. 2 Because Canada asserted its rights
under the Treaty, it is fully operative; therefore, a violation may be
asserted.
The facts as developed by Canada in Wainwright are governed by
the rule announced in Ford224 and Cook.225 If state officials participated in any manner in the kidnapping, that would clearly constitute
state action. From the asylum state's perspective, it is important to
note that in Wainwright Canada did not participate in the kidnapping of one of its citizens. More importantly, Canada not only filed
numerous objections with the United States Department of State,
but also filed a petition of habeas corpus in the federal district court.
These affirmative acts, whether successful or not, remove the events
in question from Ker-Frisbie analysis and place it into the realm of
cases involving treaty violations. Of course, the state action allegations must be proven in order for Canada to achieve its ultimate
goal.

226

221.

See, e.g., Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 415-23; Ker, 119 U.S. at 442. See also Lujan, 510

F.2d at 67; U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2(4); O.A.S.

CHARTER

art. 17.

222. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67.
223. Id.
224. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
225. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
226. A determination of whether private conduct has such a state involvement or nexus as
to constitute state action requires that the facts in each case be sifted and the circumstances
weighed. Sims v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 611 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Life Ins. Co.
of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1979); Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv.,
536 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1976); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153, 165 (6th Cir. 1973).
Whether an activity constitutes state action is therefore a flexible standard. Bach v. Mount
Clemens Gen. Hosp., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 686, 687 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
In Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979), the court noted that the proper
inquiry for state action purposes focuses on the source of authority for the private conduct
involved. If the state has clothed the activity with its apparent authority to act, then that
private conduct constitutes state action. The decisions which discuss state action have applied
various formulas to fit the facts of individual cases. Id. at 800. Those arising in the context of
private action taken pursuant to a state statute have alternatively suggested that the state is
responsible only when it compels an act, see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164
(1978); Waters v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 618 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980), and that the state
is responsible when it authorizes or encourages conduct which would otherwise be unpermissible, see Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D. Conn. 1976); McDuffy v. Worthmore
Furniture, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 257, 261 (E.D. Va. 1974), and that the state is responsible for
"prohibitory" legislation when it is employed privately to deny a right on an impermissible
basis. See Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1240-41 (5th Cir. 1981).
Decisions which arise in the context of private actions which involve the use of state court
proceedings suggest that state judicial proceedings do not constitute state action when the state
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4. Treaty Violation's Effect on Other Nations' Sovereignty
The determination of whether to grant an extradition request is
within the sovereign prerogative of the asylum state. Article 8 of the
courts merely provide a forum for suit between persons, see Stevens v. Frick, 372 F.2d 378, 381
(2d Cir. 1967); Weisser v. Medical Care Sys., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp.
1218, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), but that state judicial proceedings do constitute state action when
the state courts are being utilized by an offending party to accomplish an unlawful purpose. See
Hollis v. Itawamba County Loans, 657 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1981); Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277,
281 (5th Cir. 1980); Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 1183, 1193 (6th Cir. 1974);
Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439, 448-52 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Girard v. 94th Street #7 Fifth Ave.
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 453-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Walton v. Darby Towhouses, Inc., 395 F.
Supp. 553, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The underlying consistency behind the apparently diverse holdings of the above-cited cases is that in each case the inquiry focused on whether the state
provided the means whereby a private party committed an act "generally associated with a
power exercised by the sovereign." Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Management Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23,
30-32 (6th Cir. 1975). The means through which a private party becomes associated with an
exercise of sovereign authority, however, is not limited to merely statutory and judicial contacts
with the state. Nor does the existence of any particular statutory or judicial contact in a given
case guarantee that private action is entwined with the state's power to a degree sufficient to
justify charging the state with responsibility for another's private acts. Ultimately, every contact must be evaluated and some balance must be struck for or against association. Sims, 611
F.2d at 611.
Various considerations have contributed toward a finding of state action in given cases. In
Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975), the court held that
private, individual conduct may be found to constitute state action: (1) where state courts enforce an agreement affecting private parties, (2) where the state significantly involves itself with
the private party, and (3) where there is private performance of a government function. Id. at
1333-35. In Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), the court held that the
factors important to the determination of "state action" by a private organization were:
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is dependent upon governmental aid;
(2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory scheme; (3) whether that
scheme connotes governmental approval of the activity or whether the assistance is
merely provided to all without such connotations; (4) the extent to which the organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the state; and (5) whether the
organization has legitimate claims to recognition as a "private" organization in associational or other constitutional terms.
Id. at 629.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), the court held in a
slightly different context that there may be a finding of state action:
(1) when a private party's action occurred in conjunction with a business in which the
state may be considered a partner or joint venturer in a profit making field, (2) when a
state statute, custom or usage compels some result, (3) when a state agency affirmatively
orders or specifically approves the activity in the course of its regulatory rule making, or
(4) when a private agency in effect is acting on behalf of and furnishing a government
service.

Id. at 757.
In yet other contexts, courts have found state action where the private party derived "some
aid, comfort or incentive, either real or apparent, from the state," see Jenkers v. White Castle
Sys., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 981, 982 (N.D. Il.1981) (quoting Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479
F.2d 756, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1973)), and where the state "had sufficiently insinuated itself in a
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United States-Canada Extradition Treaty codifies this rule of cusposition of independence" with the private party so that it became a joint participant in the
activity, see Lyon v. Temple Univ., 507 F. Supp. 471, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1981), and where the state
exercised its power in aid of private conduct and thus provided means whereby private party
commits an act associated with the power exercised by the state. See Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 689, 694-95 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
The standard evidenced by the cases requires that all contacts between the state and private party be evaluated and weighed, and that state action be found when private action is so
entwined with the exercise of state power as to permit the state to be held responsible for the
private action and the relationship is symbiotic.
In Wainwright, the issue of governmental action vel non resolves itself to determining
whether the bail bondsmen acted solely in a private capacity or whether they acted as agents
for the State of Florida. If they acted as agents of the state, a treaty violation is involved since,
even disregarding the territorial limitation on their authority under the bond, the state could
only proceed by extradition. Since it is settled law that the authority of a bondsman to enforce
his contractual rights is confined to the territory of the United States, a state has no right to
insist that a bail bondsman obtain, pursuant to contractual authority, a person from an asylum
state and return him to the state. In Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13, 21-22 (1870),
it was noted with respect to a bondsman's right to arrest: "This power of arrest can only be
exercised within the territory of the United States; and there is an implied covenant on the
part of the principal with his sureties, when he is admitted to bail, that he will not depart out
of this territory without their assent." Conversely, action in accordance with the bond, concededly does not constitute state action as a matter of law, even though the action is taken in order
to return a bail jumper to court. See, e.g., Easley v. Blossom, 394 F. Supp. 343, 345 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D. Minn. 1969); Thomas v. Miller, 282
F. Supp. 571, 572-73 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
But in Wainwright, Canada argued that Florida promoted Johnsen and Kear's action. If
Canada is correct, then they acted under the color of authority of the state. The abduction was,
therefore, an action by Florida and, hence, a violation of the extradition treaty. See Ouzts v.
Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1974) (direct or indirect promotion); Warren v. Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Colo. 1969) (encouragement). Promoting, in the
sense used here, means an action by state officials constituting either direct participation in the
abduction, or direct causation of the abduction. Cf. Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152
(1970); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 5
(9th Cir. 1966). Acting under color of state authority, in this context means, at the least, overt
reliance on state authority as contained in documentary indicia.
In Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979), a case involving the question
whether there had been sufficient "state action" when bondsmen kidnapped the plaintiff, in the
context of a civil rights action for damages, the court stated:
The fact that Kear and Mathusa possessed a State of Virginia bench warrant for Thomas
Maynard and acted or purported to act pursuant to the authority of the bench warrant
in seizing Maynard is sufficient to constitute the required state action. . . . Kear had in
his possession the bench warrant issued by a Virginia state court. Though Kear never
showed the warrant to Maynard, Kear did show the warrant to the police officers before
the seizure of Maynard, during the police investigation at the apartment, and at the
police station after seizure. Throughout the incident, the bondsmen acted or purported
to be acting under the authority of the state bench warrant. That such conduct constitutes state action is made clear by the United States Supreme Court: "If an individual is
possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state
action. It is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely
private capacity or that the particular state action which he took was not authorized by
state law .. "
In Griffin [v. Maryland], the Supreme Court found the Fourteenth Amendment to be
violated by an employee of an amusement park, acting under the color of his authority as
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tomary international law. 2 7 Article 8 makes the determination solely
a matter of domestic law based upon whether the request meets the
terms and conditions of the Treaty.2 28
A state's unlawful kidnapping from an asylum state to obtain personal jurisdiction over a fleeing felon violates the territorial integrity
of the asylum state.22 In Wainwright, Canada argued that the state's
intervention into Canada's internal affairs deprived Canada of its independence as a sovereign nation. As a result, the decentralized state,
acting as the agent of the nation-state, secured the "advantage" of
personal jurisdiction over a fugitive which should not be recognized
under international law.23 0
Canada's agreement to surrender fugitives from justice found
within its territory according to the provisions of the Treaty is not
equivalent to a complete surrender of its sovereignty in the area of
criminal jurisdiction to a decentralized state or any other foreign entity.2 ' The partial surrendering of Canada's sovereignty by creating a
duty to extradite those individuals captured pursuant to the Treaty
provisions does not create a corresponding rule authorizing the
United States (or any state thereof) to enter, seize and remove individuals not properly captured.2 2
The principle of pacta sunt servanda oblitgates the United States
a deputy sheriff, who ordered a black man to leave the park because of his race. In Smith
v. Rosenbaum,. .. state action was found when bondsmen acted pursuant to a bail piece
obtained in a forma manner from a court clerk. In United States v. Trunho, . . . state
action was found where a special deputy sheriff flashed his badge and a bench warrant
upon seizing a person who had jumped bond. Other cases concerning recapture by
bondsmen which have dismissed the Section 1980 claims for lack of state action are distinguishable by the fact that the bondsmen did not act or purport to act, under authority
of a state bench warrant ...
Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted). But see Jaffe v. Smith, No. 86-3540 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 1987).
227. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8 ("The determination that extradition should or should
not be granted shall be made in accordance with the law of the requested State.").
228. Id.
229. See generally Harvard Research, supra note 41.
230. Declaration, supra note 22, art. 1(g).
231. See Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, 1 Perm. Ct. of Int'l Justice 15 (1923). The P.C.I.J.
stated:
The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State undertakes to
perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty.
No doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the
exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be
exercised in a certain way.

Id. at 25.
232. See The Case of the S.S. Lotus, 2 Perm. Ct. of Int'l Justice 4, 18 (1927) ("[Flailing
the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary, [a state] may not exercise its power in any
form in the territory of another state.").
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to adhere to the procedure set out in the Treaty's provisions for return of an individual present in Canada charged with, or convicted of
an offense in the United States.2 " Article 9 requires that the request
for extradition be made through the diplomatic channels.2 34 Florida
failed to make such a request as is required by the Treaty.
When a state disputes the method by which alleged fugitives from
state justice may be returned to its territorial jurisdiciton, by all
standards of civilized behavior it must adhere to peaceful methods of
dispute resolution. Under the doctrines of sovereignty and sovereign
equality as well as the Extradition Treaty, where a state fails to follow this well-established procedure and resorts to extra-legal means
to secure personal jurisdiction over a fugitive in order that it may
enforce its criminal prescriptions it violates its national as well as
international duty to desist from force. It is an established presumption in international law that extraordinary or extra-legal processes
are invalid unless all ordinary procedures are first exhausted.2 3 Here
Florida did not even complete the formal documents requesting extradition of the fugitive.
By failing to follow Treaty guidelines, Florida was essentially
guilty of kidnapping. This type of action has a substantial impact on
the world community. Extradition of fugitives between nations is undeniably a matter between sovereign governments and of foreign intercourse requiring diplomatic relations and treaties between nations.
Under the United States Constitution, this power is exclusively federal.2 36 Individual states of the Union are expressly prohibited from
exercising this power under Article I, section 10.237
Florida, by enforcing its criminal jurisdiction within Canadian territorial jurisdiction, deprived Canada of its equality as a sovereign
nation.23 8 Canada's right to grant asylum was for all intents and purposes subordinated to external impact upon domestic decisions. The
fact is that what customary international law prohibits the federal
government from doing, it also prevents the individual states in the
239
union from committing the same acts.
233. Treaty, supra note 4.
234. Id. art. 9.
235. Id.
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See also Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
238. See The Antelope Case, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122-23 (1825) (Court stated that as a
result of "this equality no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself
but its legislation can operate on itself alone.").
239. See generally W. RICE, LAW AMONG STATES IN FEDERACY: A SURVEY OF DECISIONS OF
THE Swiss FEDERAL TRIBUNAL IN INTERCANTONAL CONTROVERSIES (1959).
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5. Individuals' Rights
Both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Universal Declaration) 4 provide sources for customary rules
of international law in the area of human rights. Individual rights
and freedoms are finally assuming a paramount role in international
law.241 The excesses and atrocities committed in World War II provided the impetus for these attitudinal changes. The world community has begun to recognize the ultimate and undeniable link between
a government's behavior towards its own people and the peace and
security of the international community. This recognition is evident
in the wording of the Preamble to the U.N. Charter:
We the Peoples of the United States determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small ....24
Moreover, one of the U.N.'s purposes under the Charter is "[t]o
achieve international co-operation. . . in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights . . ..."' Because the Charter did not con-

tain a definition of human rights, the General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration to further define those rights.24 4
245
United States courts have held the Charter not self-executing.
In contrast, in The Namibia Case the I.C.J. argued that the Charter
imposed human rights obligations on the member states and that
these obligations must be self-executing.246 Notwithstanding this is240. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. See also HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 34. See generally Brief for Appellee, Jaffe v. Wainwright, Habeas Corpus, Case No. 82-1100-CIV-J-M. (amicus curiae).
241. J. STARKE, supra note 16, at 64.
GAL

242. U.N. CHARTER, Preamble. See F. KIRGIS,
SETTING 921-48 (1977).
243. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LE-

244. See generally Universal Declaration, supra note 240. See also L. SOHN & T.
BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 519 (1973) (authors argue

that, as an authoritative interpretation of rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter, member states are bound by the human rights provisions of the charter to the same extent as they
are by the other provisions of the Charter).

245. See Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965). In one case holding a section of
the Alien Land Law violative of the fourteenth amendment, the concurring opinions referred to
the section's inconsistencies with the U.N. Charter. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50,
673 (1948) (Black & Murphy, JJ., concurring).
246. The Namibia Case, Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa Notwithstanding Security
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sue, United States courts have been willing to recognize that the
Charter's provisions on human rights and the Universal Declaration
are evidence of principles of customary international law recognized
as part of the law of the United States.2 4
The customary international law rule in effect at the time of the
Ker decision was that, although individuals owed obligations to the
community of nations, they received no corresponding rights. 24 8' However, since that time the status of the individual under international
law has undergone a radical alteration.2 49 Through developments in
international human rights law, the individual has acquired a quasilegal personality. The state against whom the protection is offered
cannot waive the human rights guarantees intended to benefit its
nationals.6 0
Among the nonwaivable rights is the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention guaranteed both by customary and conventional law. 2 51 The U.N. has clarified the rule regarding arbitrary
arrest and detention in various resolutions.2 52 The Standard Minimum Rules (Rules) establish the "basic norms of human dignity and
... certain practices . . . repugnant to the conscience of manCouncil Res. 276 (1970)), 1971 I.C.J. 16.
247. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-83 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974); Larean v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1186-88 (D.
Conn. 1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, §§ 102(1)(b), 102(3), 131(5) & 10(z)
comment h (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). See also Briefing Book, The Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1986 (H.R. 4756 & S.2528) (1986).
248. See Cardozo, supra note 212, at 132; Hunt, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L
L. 678, 682-83 (1953).
249. See L. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 148-53, 941-62; J. STARKE, supra note 16, at 64.
250. United States policy demands the promotion and protection of internationally recognized fundamental "human rights" in accordance with its international obligations as set forth
in the U.N. Charter and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the
United States. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1 (1979). Further, it would appear that a principal
goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries. While the human rights obligations of the
United States are not contained in any self-executing treaty, they are nonetheless binding as
expressions of federal policy preempting state interference with implementation of a uniform
national foreign policy. Cf. Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 196-200 (1980).
251. See Maki, General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by all Nations:
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 272 (1980); Sarasody,
JurisdictionFollowing Illegal Extra-territorialSeizure: InternationalHuman Rights Obligations as an Alternative to Constitutional Stalemate, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1439 (1976). See also
Sucharitkul, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 62 N.D.L.
REV. 305 (1987).

252. See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ECOSOC Res.
663C (XXIV), 31 July 1957, ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LVII), 13 May 1957 [hereinafter Rules];
Study of the Right of Everyone to Be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, 34 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. (No. 8), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev. 1 (1964) [hereinafter Study].
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These standards relate to a fair administration of justice

similar to the due process clause.254 The Supreme Court has also
cited the Rules as evidence of "contemporary standards of decency"
55
for purposes of interpreting the eighth amendment.
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has also examined the
right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention. 56 The Commission stressed the crucial importance of this safeguard. Without the
right to be free, a person cannot enjoy or exercise most of the Declaration's other enumerated rights.257 Pursuant to its Study, the Commission prepared the Draft Principles on the Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention (Principles).

5

The Principles established

procedures to which all law and practice should conform in order to
render the fullest protection of the right to liberty and security of the
person in regard to arrest and detention2 59 Derived from a study of
the procedures of ninety-one nations, the Principles' most fundamental rule is that international agreements affording the petitioner protection include the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) and the Optional Protocol thereto.2 60
The Covenant codifies the customary rules of international
human rights law. 26 ' Approximately seventy states have ratified or
acceded to the Covenant, including Canada. Among those states signing but not yet ratifying the Covenant is the United States. In accordance with the Vienna Convention, a state that has signed a treaty
subject to its ratification and entry into force is under an obligation
"to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
262
[that] treaty.
The rights guaranteed under the Covenant are contained in Articles 9, 10 and 14.263 They include: due process,26 " immediate description of reasons for arrest or detention and statement of charges,265
253. Rules, supra note 252.
254. Larean v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 (D. Conn. 1980).
255. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 & n.8 (1976); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S.
889, 890 & n.1 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
256. Study, supra note 252, at 218-19.
257. Id. at 208.
258. Id. at 218-19 (the Principles are a portion of the Study).
259. Id.
260. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 220, 21 GAOR
Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant]; Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex to G.A. Res. 220, 21 GAOR Supp.
(No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 59 (1966) [hereinafter Protocol].
261. Covenant, supra note 260.
262. Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 18.
263. Covenant, supra note 260, arts. 9, 10 & 14.
264. Id. art. 9(1).
265. Id. arts. 9(2) & 14(3)(a).
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prompt first appearance and speedy trial, 2 " probable cause hearing
on arrest or detention, 2 67 inherent dignity of the individual, 2 68 equal
protection,2 69 right to a fair and public trial, 7 0 presumption of innocence, 27 1 right to an attorney of choice and sufficient time to adequately prepare a defense, 7 2 right to be present at trial, 7 3 and the
defendant's rights to present witnesses on his behalf and to confront
witnesses against him.27 4 Furthermore, a state's separate ratification
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Protocol) ensures all individuals subject to its jurisdiction the right to personally petition the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights for an alleged violation of any right contained in the
2 75
Covenant.
6.

Internationally Wrongful Acts

States are normally held liable for acts which violate international
law. 7 6 The Don Sessarego Case,27 for example, held as "universally
recognized [the] principle of international law that a State is responsible for breaches of the law of nations committed by its agents
...
278 Customary international law as codified in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
(Draft Articles) Specifically rejects as irrelevant the internal organization and division of powers in the domestic context to the determination of international responsibility for the commission of internationally recognized wrongful acts.2 7 9 An internationally wrongful act
exists when "(a) conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) that conduct
constitutes a breach of an international obligation. ' 28 0 Articles 5, 6, 7,
8 and 10 of the Draft Articles established conduct considered to be
266. Id. arts. 9(3) & 14(3)(c).
267. Id. art. 9(4).
268. Id. art. 10(1).
269. Id. art. 14(1).
270. Id.
271. Id. art. 14.
272. Id. art. 14(3)(b).
273. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
274. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
275. Protocol, supra note 260.
276. M. McDouGAL, supra note 18, at 941-42.
277. 15 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 400 (1901) (decision of the Italian-Peruvian Arbitration).
278. Id. at 401.
279. Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on State Responsibility [Report of the Int'l Law
Comm'n on the Work of its Thirty-Fifth Session], 14 May-3 Aug. 1979, GAOR Supp. (No. 10),
U.N. Doc. A/34/10, at 239 (1979) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
280. Id. art. 3. "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State." Id. art. 1.
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an act of a state.2"
From an international survey of state practice in the area, it is
considered general state practice for the violating state to surrender
an individual to the violated state which subsequently protests the
infringement of its sovereign rights."8 ' The courts of some states,
such as France and Belgium, refuse to exercise jurisdiction in these
cases.2 83 Therefore, it would seem that general state practice demands at the very least that the state seizing and detaining an individual in violation of international law surrender him upon protest
by the state whose sovereignty was violated.28 4 Furthermore, Article
27 of the Vienna Convention prohibits a party from invoking the provisions of its internal law to justify its failure to perform a treaty
obligation.2 8 5
Moreover, Article 4 of the Draft Articles states that an act of a
state may only be characterized as internationally wrongful by application of international law. 8 " Such characterization is unaffected by
a state's classification of the same act as lawful.2 87 Under Article 20, a
further breach occurs when an international obligation requires a
state to adopt a particular course of conduct, and the state's conduct
remains inconsistent with that obligation.28
In cases involving kidnapping of individuals across international
boundaries, the general state practice is either to release the individual upon the protest of the nation whose sovereign rights have been
281. See id. art. 5 ("conduct of any State organ having that status under the internal law
of that State"); id. art. 6 ("conduct of an organ of the State ... whether that organ belongs to
the constituent, legislative, judicial or other power, whether its functions are of an international
or an internal character and whether it holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organization of that State"); id. art. 7(1) ("conduct of an organ of a territorial government entity with
a State"); id. art. 7(2) ("conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal structure of the State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is empowered by the internal
law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority"); id. art. 8 ("conduct of a
person or group of persons. . . if: (a) it is established that such person or group of persons was
in fact acting on behalf of that State"); id. art. 10 ("conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial governmental entity or of an entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental
authority, such organ having acted in that capacity . . . even if, in the particular case, the
organ exceeded its competence according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning
its activity").
282. See, e.g., Abrahams v. Minister of Justice, 4 So. Afr. L.R. 542 (1963); Note, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case, 30 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 123 (1936).
283. See, e.g., In re Nollet (1891), reprinted in 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 502, 506 n.18 (1935);
Soblen v. Argoud (1963) Cour de Surete do rEtat, reprinted in 1 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L
88-124 (1965). See also O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MODERN L.
REV. 521 (1964).
284. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 1, at 93-98.
285. Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 27.
286. Draft Articles, supra note 279, art. 4.
287. Id.
288. Id. art. 20.
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impugned, or to refuse totally to exercise jurisdiction where individuals are brought before the courts.2" 9 The United States courts, in accepting in personam jurisdiction in such cases, commit a further internationally wrongful act: the denial of justice.290
V.

CONCLUSION

In Wainwright, Canada correctly argued that international responsibility for the internationally wrongful acts committed by individuals acting under apparent color of state authority violated: (1)
Canadian territorial sovereignty, (2) the United States-Canada Extradition Treaty, and (3) the personal rights of the fugitive guaranteed under customary and conventional international law and by the
domestic law of Canada. Thus, the abduction from Canada of the fugitive from Florida violated the Treaty, 91 thereby depriving the violating state of jurisdiction. The bounty hunters had no right to invade Canada. Their invasion supported by judicial implementation of
the state law was, as former Attorney General Smith noted, contrary
to the best interests of the United States. As a leader in the world
community, the United States is well aware of the fact that abductions are generally violative of international law292 and cannot be
honored unless the asylum state aids and abets in the perpetration of
the act.
289. The subject recently came up in the State of Washington. Donald Walters was
wanted on a federal currency charge and had defaulted on a $40,000 bond. Two bounty hunters
forced him onto a seaplane in waters off British Columbia, Canada, to be flown back to the
United States. When a witness reported the incident to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
the two bounty hunters (who had stayed behind in Canada) were arrested for kidnapping in
Victoria. When the defendant, Walters, was brought before the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington the next day, the United States Attorney for that district
asked the judge to dismiss the indictment for a period of one day to allow Walters to return to
Canada. He explained that the United States Department of Justice had recommended this
course of action. "Although no U.S. Government agents were involved in this illegal enterprise," he further explained "we do not in this instance wish to profit from these private actions or to encourage such cross-border forays in the future." See News Release, Dep't of Justice, U.S. Att'y, W.D. Washington (Feb. 19, 1985) (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 8, §§ 431-32, at 292-307 (Tent. Draft No. 6 1985).
290. See, e.g., I. SHEARER, supra note 28, at 75.
291. Treaty, supra note 4.
292. Universal Declaration, supra note 240, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person."); id. art. 5 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); id. art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law."); id. art. 9 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile."); id. art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him."); id. art. 11 ("Everyone charged with a
penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a
pubilc trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.").
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Human rights guarantees protect an individual even against violations by his own state.!" Consequently, the state can no longer waive
violations of these guarantees without disregarding its international
obligations. The United States can no longer feign ignorance of its
international obligations. It must recognize that Canada did not
waive any rights under the Extradition Treaty or customary international law. Rather, the United States deprived Canada of the right to
ensure compliance with recognized human rights guarantees.
Canada, as a full party to the Covenant, undertook its obligations
"to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized [therein] ....."' By
also ratifying the Protocol, Canada guaranteed individuals within its
jurisdiction the right to present alleged human rights' violations to
the Commission. A state within the United States involved in the
illegal seizure and removal of the fugitive from Canadian jurisdiction
prevented Canada from fulfilling its international obligations under
the Covenant.
Moreover, as a signatory to the Covenant, the United States was
bound under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention to refrain from any
acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty.2 9 Not only did the
Covenant require the state to comply with the rule of law in obtaining a fugitive's presence, 9" it also mandated the state to ensure
that the rights and freedoms delineated in the Covenant are not destroyed by activities of any person or group.2 9 7
The reluctance of the United States to condemn the practice of
mala captus bene detentus is puzzling when considered in the context of Ker-Frisbie.Ker-Frisbie permits, as does international practice, irregular renditions. Canada has objected to an abduction, not
an irregular rendition. Mala captus bene detentus has outlived its
role in the civilized world community and certainly has no place in
either United States foreign policy or United States courts. Justice
Frankfurter said it best in Sherman v. United States.2 98
Insofar as they are used as instrumentalities in the administration of criminal justice, the federal courts have an obligation to set their face against enforcement of the law by lawless
293. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.
1974). See generally Note, Extraditionin an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 654 (1986).
294. Covenant, supra note 260, art. 2(1).
295. Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 18.
296. The rule of law in this case is the Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Canada. See Treaty, supra note 4.
297. Covenant, supra note 260, art. 5.
298. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss2/2

42

Baldwin: Some Observations Concerning External Power of Decentralized Unit
EXTERNAL POWER OF STATES

1986]

means or means that violate rationally vindicated standards
of justice, and to refuse to sustain such methods by effectuating them . .

Public confidence in the fair and honorable

administration of justice upon which ultimately depends the
rule of law, is the transcending value at stake.299

299.

Id. at 380.
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